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Implementation, or the Possible Lack Thereof, of 
the Bilski Supreme Court Decision 
INTRODUCTION 
“It is true that patents for inventions that did not satisfy the machine-
or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras . . .  But times 
change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways.”1 
 
Our patent system appears to be facing yet another new frontier.  Many 
commentators have opined that the recent Supreme Court Bilski decision 
provides little by way of clear and cogent parameters for method-claim 
eligibility,2 creating a quagmire for patent examiners and patent 
practitioners in their roles as primary gatekeepers of the patent system.3 The 
consequences of such ambiguities are subjective interpretations of the law 
that can only weaken the current prosecution mechanism or, at the very 
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 1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 3231 (“The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a patentable 
‘process’ . . . ”). See Benjamin W. Hattenbach & Kenneth J. Weatherwax, Bilski v. Kappos: A 
Divided Court Narrowly Reaffirms Patentability of Business Methods, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L. J. 15, 16 (2010) (“Exactly what process might be patent-eligible, the Court’s opinion went to 
great lengths not to say, causing widespread disappointment among practitioners.”). 
 3. See Tony Mauro, High Court All Over the Map in ‘Bilski’, THE NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL (June 29, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463099629 
&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (stating that the Bilski decision did little to resolve what requirements 
must be met for a business method to be considered patentable); Kevin E. Noonan, Bilski v. 
Kappos: What Effects on Biotechnology Patents?, PATENT DOCS: SUPREME COURT (July 1, 
2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/07/bilski-v-kappos-what-effects-on-biotechnology- 
patents html (discussing difficulties the Federal Circuit will have developing new tests for patent-
eligibility of method claims). 
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least, result in inconsistent practices.4 The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) has issued several interim guidelines for 
Examiners in an effort to quell confusion and meld these newly decided 
rules of law into the complex examination system.5 However, the success of 
implementing these interpretations may be limited by the structure of the 
examination process, particularly when the rules of law pertain to threshold 
statutory inquiries.6 If one is to consider the current onslaught of 
precedents, there is a strong possibility that cases requiring statutory 
interpretation are not anomalies, but rather the beginnings of new and 
uncharted patent territories.7 As the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI) noted:  
 
Although a case has not yet been presented, we believe that a 
similar ‘special case’ exists for ‘manufactures’ which store 
programs that cause a machine to perform an abstract idea, e.g., 
a computer program to perform a mathematical algorithm stored 
on a tangible medium: the nominal recitation of a ‘manufacture’ 
does not preclude the claim from being nonstatutory subject 
matter.8 
 
By revisiting the BPAI Bilski decision9 and the appellate court Bilski 
decision in light of the Supreme Court holding,10 this article explores the 
possible impact of the Bilski Supreme Court decision on the 
examination/prosecution process, and suggests reasons why the system may 
not be able to provide clear and precise renderings as it has been able to do 
 
 4. See Hattenbach, supra note 2, at 18 (describing how the Bilski opinion “[has] the potential 
to reopen complex questions once thought to have been settled” and permits individual Federal 
Circuit panels to once again “reach idiosyncratic conclusions regarding the boundaries of patent-
eligible subject matter.”). 
 5. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View 
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,923 (July 27, 2010). 
 6. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
 7. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541, 3541 (2010) 
(precipitating statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by remanding case to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in light of Bilski); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543, 3543 (2010) (remanding the case in light of Bilski); Ex 
parte Proudler, No. 2009-006599, 2010 WL 2727840, at *2 (B.P.A.I. July 8, 2010) (stating that 
Bilski solidified the unpatentability of abstract ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 8. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 16 n.6 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 9. See id. 
 10. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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for other statutory provisions.11 However, it is not the intent of this paper to 
formulate tests or guidelines. Rather, it is hoped that this paper will 
illuminate various relevant points that may aid others in developing 
working models for examination and prosecution practice, which in turn 
will better assist in the protection of existing technologies, enhance 
protection for emerging technologies, and perhaps even “anticipate” better 
protective schemes for future technologies.   
BACKGROUND 
“Students of patent law would be well advised to study these scholarly 
opinions.”12 
 
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw filed a patent application on April 
10, 1997 for “Energy Risk Management Method.”13 The application was 
directed to a method for hedging risks in commodities trading,14 where the 
claims recited (a) a transaction between an intermediary commodity 
provider and consumers of the commodity, (b) purchase of fixed rate 
commodities based upon calculable factors such as historical averages and 
(c) transactions between the commodity provider and market participants at 
a second fixed-rate where the first and second fixed rates are balanced.15 
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 USC § 101, stating that the 
invention “[(a)] is not implemented on a specific apparatus, [but rather] 
merely manipulates an abstract idea, [(b) further] solves a purely 
mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, [and 
(c)] is not directed to the technological arts.”16 The BPAI held that 
transformation of “non-physical financial risks and legal liabilities of the 
commodity provider, the consumer, and the market participants” is not 
 
 11. See Ex parte Isaksen, No. 91-2308 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 19, 1992) (stating that the PTO and 
practitioners were able to properly interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112 without the Federal Circuit). But see 
Sang Hui Michael Kim, In re Alappat: A Strict Statutory Interpretation Determining Patentable 
Subject Matter Relating to Computer Software?, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
635, 654 (1995) (asserting that the Federal Circuit applied a strict statutory interpretation to 35 
U.S.C. § 112 in contrast to the PTO). 
 12. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233 (2010). 
 13. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949; Energy Risk Management Method, U.S. Patent Application 
No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 16, 1996) (rejected June 28, 2010). 
 14. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See generally PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 314–47 (1st ed. 2004). 
 15. Energy Risk Management Method, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at 10 (filed 
Apr. 16, 1996) (rejected June 28, 2010). 
 16. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 3. 
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patent-eligible subject matter;17 that the claims “preempt any and every 
possible way of performing the steps . . . by human . . . machine or by any 
combination thereof . . . .”;18 that the claims are an abstract idea ineligible 
for patent protection and that the claims do not produce a “useful, concrete 
and tangible result.”19 However, the BPAI also held that the “technological 
arts” test20 is not supported by case law and that there is no requirement for 
specific apparatus if there is a transformation of physical subject matter 
from one state to another.21 
The appellate court affirmed the BPAI’s ruling stating that that the 
Supreme Court has enunciated a definite test to determine whether process 
claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101,22 and that the application 
of a law of nature or mathematical statement is patentable, however claims 
seeking to preempt all uses of a fundamental principle are unpatentable .23 
The test also determines that analysis of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 102 (novelty) and/or 35 USC § 103 (obviousness) is irrelevant to 35 USC 
§ 101 analysis; and that Congress did not intend the “new and useful” 
language of § 101 to be an independent requirement of § 102 and § 103.24 
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the BPAI’s evaluation of § 101 
patentable subject matter under the “machine-or-transformation” test25 is 
 
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Id. at 46. 
 19. Id. at 23 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 20. Id. at 28. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A 1970) (“All that is necessary, 
in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 
is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to 
promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’”). 
 21. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 42, 57. 
 22. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court, however, has 
enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the 
principle itself. A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or 
thing.”). 
 23. Id. at 953. 
 24. Id. at 958. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1981). 
 25. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 961 (“The machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched 
inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his 
claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article.”). See Ex 
parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 53–57; See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 71 (1972) 
(noting the argument that a process patent must be tied to a machine or must be able to change 
materials into different states of being). 
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accurate while the “useful concrete and tangible result” test26  articulated 
used by the BPAI is inadequate.27 The appellate court also held that Bilski 
was seeking to claim a fundamental principle, abstract idea or mental 
process, and attempting to preempt all uses of a fundamental principle.28 
Thus the claims recited by Bilski were not patent-eligible.29 
Bilski appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted on 
June 1, 2009.30 The Supreme Court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 specifies 
processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter as patent-
eligible categories of invention which Congress intended to give “wide 
scope.”31 However, there are three exceptions to § 101’s broadness, which 
are: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”32 While so, 
review of patent-eligibility under § 101 is a “threshold test” and it must also 
satisfy the requirements of novelty under § 102, nonobviousness under    
§103 and a full and particular description under § 112.33 The Court also 
held that the “machine-or-transformation” test articulated by the appellate 
court is not the sole test for patent eligibility under § 101.34 The Court held 
that Bilski’s claims are not “process” claims under § 101, but recite an 
“abstract idea” as articulated in Gottschalk v. Benson,35 Parker v. Flook,36 
and Diamond v. Diehr.37 The Court held that the claims were directed to a 
mathematical formula which are abstract ideas that are not patent-eligible.38 
Additionally, the Court held:  
 
 
 26. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that a computer-implemented system that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible 
result is patentable subject matter). 
 27. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60. 
 28. Id. at 965–66. 
 29. Id. at 966. 
 30. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4103, at *1 (June 1, 2009). 
 31. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224–25 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 3238 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 85 (1981)). 
 33. Id. at 3225 (majority opinion). 
 34. Id. at 3228. 
 35. 409 U.S. 64 (1972). 
 36. 437 U.S. 584  (1978). 
 37. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. See also Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 (explaining that laws of 
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are excluded from patent protection); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (noting that natural phenomena are not what the patent statute 
was created to protect); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 67 (1972) (explaining that abstract 
ideas are not patentable because they are the basic tools of scientific work). 
 38. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3131. 
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[The claims] attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of 
hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of 
well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of 
the inputs into the equation. Indeed, these claims add even less to 
the underlying abstract principle than the invention [held patent 
ineligible] in Flook did.39 
 
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Kennedy, joined by 
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito in full, and by Justice Scalia in part;40 
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer and Sotomayer.41 Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion joined in 
part by Justice Scalia.42   
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 
“[T]he primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies 
in the Patent Office. To await litigation is — for all practical purposes — to 
debilitate the patent system.”43  
 
The concept of an “abstract idea” lies at the very core of judicial 
consternation with Bilski, namely a shift in patent eligibility analysis from 
the other 35 U.S.C. § 101 categories of inventions.44 As stated by the BPAI, 
“[M]ethod claims do not have to recite what structure is used to perform the 
steps, making them abstract in nature, whereas claims to things, 
‘machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter,’ easily fall within 
§101 (subject to the ‘special case’ of abstract ideas performed on 
machines).” 45 Additionally, Judge Newman stated in his appellate court 
dissenting opinion that “[t]he Court in Flook discussed that abstractions and 
fundamental principles have never been subject to patenting, but recognized 
the ‘unclear line’ between an abstract principle and the application of such 
principle . . .”46 Against this backdrop, each of the reviewing bodies 
 
 39. Id. at 3231. See also Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (noting the chemical processes involved in 
catalytic conversion are not patentable). 
 40. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. 
 41. Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia joins as to Part II, concurring in the 
judgment.  Id. 
 43. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
 44. See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 45. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 28 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 26, 2006) (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. 
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conceptualized the very nature of “process” claims by plunging into the 
depths of Patent Acts over their evolutionary path, as well as exploring a 
barrage of judicially created tests for determining patent-eligible subject 
matter.47 Specifically, the Judiciaries sought clarity on whether non-
machine based methodologies could find patent shelter.48   
The BPAI made the initial inquiry, noting that a “‘process’ is the most 
difficult category of § 101 to define.”49 The Board spoke to the issue of 
“transformation” (the patent eligibility of processes tied to machines) as it 
relates to the “abstract idea” exception (patent ineligibility of some subject 
matter invented by man, judicially-created exclusions and laws of nature).50  
Interestingly, they interpreted the Supreme Court’s holdings in State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,51 and AT&T Corp. v. 
Excel Communications, Inc.,52 as difficult-to-address “special cases.”53 In 
its decision, the Board held that “non-machine-implemented” method 
claims that do not recite “any physical transformation of physical subject 
matter, tangible or intangible from one state into another” are patent 
ineligible.54 En route to its final analysis, it addressed several § 101 
evaluative mechanisms:  
 
The USPTO rejects method claims when they are interpreted to 
be so broad that they are directed to the abstract idea itself, 
rather than a practical implementation thereof; e.g., a series of 
 
 47. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).   
 48. See generally id. at 951–55 (majority opinion) (discussing the nature of “process” claims 
through United States Supreme Court precedent and statutory construction).   
 49. See Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 6–7 (noting the patentability issues arising from 
“non-machine-implemented” methods); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–62 (discussing how 
an applicant may show that their process claim satisfies § 101 using the machine-or-
transformation test).   
 50.  Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 15–16 (“Where the transformation of data represents 
an ‘abstract idea[,]’ . . . the fact that the claimed subject matter would otherwise be considered 
statutory because it nominally recites a ‘machine’ or machine-implemented ‘process’ or 
‘manufacture’ storing information to be read by a machine, will not prevent the claim from being 
held unpatentable.” (citing Ex Parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 1385, 1407–08 (B.P.A.I. 2005))). The 
Board distinguished between exceptions and exclusions.  The former is defined as “subject matter 
that would fall within §101 ‘but for’ some exceptional condition,” whereas exclusions are “subject 
matter that is not within §101 by definition.”  Id. at 22. 
 51. 149 F.3d 1368  (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 52. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 53. Id. at 26 (“For now, we interpret the State Street and AT&T test to be a test for when 
transformation of data by a machine is statutory subject matter.”). 
 54. Id. at 6. The court concluded that “claims 1-11 are not directed to statutory subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id. at 53. 
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steps without any recitation of how the steps are performed might 
be rejected as nonstatutory subject matter as an ‘abstract idea,’ 
whereas the same series of steps, if performed by a machine, 
might be statutory as a practical application of the abstract 
idea.55  
 
It was, however, outside of the BPAI’s realm to configure a 
mechanism by which to resolve this issue.56 Consequently, it sought the 
appellate court’s guidance in determining a test for non-machine based 
processes, noting that “many questions remain about statutory subject 
matter and what the tests are for determining statutory subject matter.”57 
The BPAI went on to state:  
 
This is not inconsistent with our position that not every series of 
steps is a ‘process’ under § 101 because the Supreme Court’s 
definition of a ‘process’ requires a transformation of physical 
subject matter from one state to another.  It would be  helpful if 
the Federal Circuit would address this question directly.58 
 
 The appellate court obliged.59  Chief Judge Michel began by stating 
that “patent-eligible subject matter under §101 is a threshold inquiry . . . “60 
More importantly, the appellate court took to an analysis of “fundamental 
principles,” better known as abstract ideas, which was for the benefit of 
both the USPTO and the courts.61 As such, Judge Michel stated:  
 
[T]he underlying legal question thus presented is what test or set 
of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) or courts as to whether a claim to a 
process is patentable under § 101, or, conversely, is drawn to 
 
 55. Id. at 28–29. 
 56. See id. at 27 (“If the Federal Circuit intends to create a new general test for statutory 
subject matter regardless of whether it involves transformation of data (signals) by a machine, 
then further explanation in an appropriate case is needed.”). 
 57. Id. at 7. See also infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 58. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 64. 
 59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering en banc review sua sponte). 
 60. Id. at 950. 
 61. Id. at 952 (noting that the true issue in the case is whether the applicants seek to claim a 
fundamental principle). See also infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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unpatentable subject matter because it claims only a fundamental 
principle.62  
 
The appellate court’s now famous “machine-or-transformation” test 
came in response to a complex question that it raised sua sponte: “How 
does one determine whether a given claim would pre-empt all uses of a 
fundamental principle?”63 As the appellate court noted, “this inquiry is 
hardly straightforward.”64 Undeterred, the appellate court looked at several 
Supreme Court precedents and determined that an exclusive test that tied 
method claims to a machine, or performed a transformation to a different 
state or thing, was the best mode for testing the soundness of method claims 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101,65 stating:  
 
Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does 
not include particular machines.  Therefore, we believe our 
reliance on the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test 
as the applicable test for §101 analyses of process claims is 
sound.66  
 
However, it recognized that the “machine-or-transformation” test may 
not be conclusive for emerging or future technologies and subsequently 
sought the Supreme Court’s guidance, recognizing “that the Supreme Court 
may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to 
accommodate emerging technologies.”67  
Once at the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy delivered the majority 
opinion.68 The two primary issues were (1) determining whether the 
machine-or-transformation test applied by the appellate court fit within the 
 
 62. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952. 
 63. Id. at 954. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 
(1972) (“It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus 
or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”). 
 66. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 67. Id. at 956 (agreeing that future developments in technology and sciences may present 
challenges to the machine-or-transformation test). 
 68. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010) (majority opinion). 
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confines of 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (2) whether business method patents 
should be categorically excluded.69   
With regards to the first issue, the Supreme Court chose to limit the 
significance of the machine-or-transformation test from being exclusive to 
merely being a consideration as part of a larger assessment.70 As Justice 
Kennedy indicated, “This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for 
determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under §101.  
The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether 
an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”71 The impetus for the Supreme 
Court’s limitation on the wide reaching impact of the machine-or- 
transformation test, as enumerated by the appellate court, was the possible 
impact an exclusive test might have on stifling the growth of biotechnology 
and future technologies.72  Justice Kennedy elaborated on this concern, “As 
numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would 
create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic 
medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data 
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.”73 The “abstract idea” 
analysis then became one pointedly directed at business methods patents on 
the whole and the Bilski patent in particular.74 Here, the Supreme Court 
chose the route of empirical evidence, using the definition of “method” in 
35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) to prove that business methods patents were, at least 
in theory, patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.75 
 
 69. Id. at 3225 (noting the two proposed categorical limitations on “process” patents). 
 70. Id. at 3227 (noting that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the United States 
Supreme Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test and that 
while the test is a useful and important clue, it is “not the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’”). 
 71. Id.. 
 72. Id. (noting that technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways and that 
the appellate court’s exclusive test would create uncertainty in many inventive fields (citing 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980))). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally id. at 3228–30 (discussing the patentability of business methods and 
concluding that the Bilski application did not include a patentable “process”). 
 75. Id. at 3228 (noting that § 273 acknowledges that there may be business method patents 
because the statute includes a prior use defense with respect to methods of doing or conducting 
business); see also 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (defining “method”). The argument that business 
methods are categorically outside of §101’s scope is further undermined by the fact that federal 
law explicitly contemplates the existence of at least some business methods patents. Under 35 
U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), if a patent-holder claims infringement based on “a method in [a] patent,” the 
alleged infringer can assert a defense of prior use. For purposes of this defense alone, “method” is 
defined as “a method of doing or conducting business . . . .” In other words, by allowing this 
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In taking this path, the Supreme Court avoided protracted discussion 
of “abstract ideas,” perhaps to signal that all that could be said had already 
been done so by the lower courts.76  
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted this 
discrepancy:  
 
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what 
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does 
not even explain if it is using the machine-or-transformation 
criteria.  The Court essentially asserts its conclusions that 
petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea. This mode of 
analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in 
this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this issue 
stand for very little.77  
 
The Supreme Court, perhaps not surprisingly, found that the Bilski 
claims were unpatentable.78 On the whole, the consistent thread through the 
entire evaluation was that the method claims recited in Bilski were drawn to 
patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101:79 not because of the 
Examiner’s holding that the claims were not directed to the “technological 
arts”80 not because the BPAI held that the claims were patent-ineligible 
under the “transformation test,” the “abstract idea exclusion,” and the 
“useful, concrete and tangible result test;”81 and finally, not because the 
appellate court held that the Bilski claims did not meet the machine-or-
transformation test.82 Instead, the Supreme Court opted for a broader ruling 
 
defense the statue itself acknowledges that there may be business method patents . . . . A 
conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render §273 
meaningless. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id. at 3251 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is a different matter altogether when the Court construes one 
statute, the 1952 Act, to give effect to a different statute, the 1999 Act. . . . Section 273 is a red 
herring; we should be focusing our attention on §101 itself.”). See Id. at 3229 (majority opinion) 
(stating that the patent application in Bilski falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract 
idea); see also infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 76. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235–36 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 3236 (majority opinion) (rejecting the patent application under precedent on the 
unpatentability of abstract ideas). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 3238–39. 
 80. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 81. Id. at 46–50. 
 82. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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by holding that the claims in question recited an “abstract idea” under 
several tests established by precedents.83   
 Despite the legal gyrations that elevated Bilski through the judiciary 
ranks, it is interesting to note the shift in perspectives from examination 
conundrums to judicial review. Throughout the BPAI Informative opinion, 
Administrative Judge Barrett expressed the difficulties placed on Examiners 
trying to apply 35 U.S.C. § 101 during the examination process, stating: 
 
Given the difficulty for examiners to make §101 rejections, and 
the clear disfavor for such rejections in the opinions of our 
reviewing court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, and in the view of many patent practitioners, it would be 
much more administratively convenient if the USPTO did not 
have to examine claims for statutory subject matter under  
§ 101.84 
 
During its review, the appellate court tried to develop a set of criteria 
that could be used by both the USPTO and the courts.85 The demarcation 
became most distinct at the Supreme Court level, where judicial review was 
entirely based upon the interpretation of precedents, statutes and the 
historical significance of the various Patent Acts, with almost no reference 
or suggestion as to how the examining corps is to perform the “abstract 
idea” analysis.86  Thus, it is unclear how much was really gained at the end 
of a very long day.  
PREDICTABLE AND UNFORSEEN CONSEQUENSES 
“Congress did not intend for these practical implications to affect the 
determination of whether an invention satisfies the requirements set forth in 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112.”87 
 
On its face, the Bilski Supreme Court decision has financial implications on 
the U.S. Examination System.88 In the heat of battle, the courts removed 
 
 83. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239. 
 84. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 8. 
 85. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958–61. 
 86. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 87. Ex Parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 9 (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
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themselves from a basic fact, namely that the USPTO is still in the business 
of granting patents.89 The USPTO’s financial resources are obtained via 
Congressional authority where appropriations are limited to the fees 
collected in a given year.90 Maintenance fees, filing, examination and 
search fees and issue fees generate approximately 81% of the total 
revenues.91 In 2009, the USPTO was allotted up to $2.0101 billion for fees 
collected during the fiscal year.92 The USPTO did not collect the fees it had 
anticipated, nor did it do so for the previous year.93 These setbacks resulted 
in examiner hiring freezes, freezes in incentive-based bonuses, suspensions 
in non-mandatory training and reduced funds for critical IT infrastructure 
projects, among other cutbacks, with projections for 2010 being worse.94 In 
2009, there were approximately 15,000 total applications filed in Class 705 
(directed to business methods).95 Set against this framework, and the 
narrow holding of the Bilski Supreme Court, the direct brunt of impact may 
be a loss of filings as well as express abandonments in vulnerable areas.96 
Given its recent history of continuous losses, it is not hard to imagine the 
deleterious effects of loss of filings based on a change in the course of 
patent law, and a fear of protracted and frivolous litigation, might have on 
the patent examination system.97 While some have suggested that the 
 
 88. See Alex Osterlind, Staking a Claim on the Building Blocks of Life: Human Genetic 
Material Within the United States Patent System, 75 MO. L. REV. 617, 631 (2010) (discussing the 
USPTO’s financial incentives in broadly interpreting patentable subject matter).   
 89. See generally U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S.P.T.O Performance and 
Accountability Report for FY 2009 at 44, http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/ 
2009/2009annualreport.pdf  (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 90. Id. at 67. Note also that this paper recognizes that the impact on the business world, 
particularly in the area of small business, may also prove dire. As of this writing, little by way of 
statistics is available to afford analysis of those forces. 
 91. Id. at 49 (stating that total revenues generated as $1927.1 million with a net loss of $54 
million). 
 92. Id. at 67. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 46–47. 
 95. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued Data, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/applicationfiling.jsp (last modified May 13, 
2010). 
 96. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.138 (2009). “Vulnerable areas” refers to applications in the business 
methods, software as well as non-device medical diagnostics and future technologies. 
 97. See Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Surveying the Patent Landscape, Post-Bilski, 
CORP. COUNSEL (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp? 
id=1202463259759 (stating that it is “ ‘incredibly expensive to ‘disprove’. . . even the silliest 
patent.”). 
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rulings may lead to an invigorated reexamination practice, it remains to be 
seen whether this is indeed the result.98   
  Beyond the financial ramifications, there is also perhaps a second, 
unforeseen and subtle consequence, namely that the norms of the patent 
prosecution legal culture may be detrimentally impacted.99 Lawrence 
Friedman defined legal culture as:  
 
‘[S]ocial forces . . . constantly at work on the law,’ ‘those parts of 
general culture—customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking—
that bend social forces toward or away from the law.’ As an 
analytical term, legal culture emphasized the role of taken for 
granted and familiar actions that operated on and within the 
interactions of the legal system and its environment.100  
 
Prevailing customs in patent prosecution include the unwritten rule 
that one is not to cite case law in rebuttal arguments unless first raised by 
the Examiner.101 It is also understood that the Examiner will likely cite 
relevant sections of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), a 
secondary precedent in the courts, in formulating legal arguments for Office 
Actions.102 The acceptance of declarations, information disclosure 
statements and affidavits, all made in good faith without formal 
authentication, is still the backbone of patent practice before the USPTO.103 
 
 98. See James A. Coles and Stephen F. Rost, Reexamination as an Alternative to Patent 
Litigation or a License, TAFT STETTINUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Sept. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.taftlaw.com/news/publications/detail/641-reexamination-as-an-alternative-to-patent-
litigation-or-a-license (“[D]efendants and potential licensees are using reexaminations more 
frequently than in the past to challenge the validity of the claims in issued patents.”). 
 99. Christopher Hilberg, Bilski v. Kappos (Finally!!!) and What It Means For Financial 
Services Patents, PATS. & THE FIN. SERVICES INDUS. (July 15, 2010), available at 
http://xelpi.com/?p=346 (stating that “practitioners and the Federal Circuit will grapple with the 
issue of what is an ‘abstract idea’ because the Supreme Court offered little, and in some ways 
puzzling, guidance on this matter  it may take many test cases to more fully develop this area of 
patent law.” 
 100. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8625 (2001) 
(citations omitted). 
 101. See Michael E. Kondoudis, A Case For Citing To The Manual Of Patent Examining 
Procedure, PATENTABLY DEFINED, (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://patentablydefined.com 
/2007/12/10/a-case-for-citing-to-the-manual-of-patent-examining-procedure (citation omitted) 
(“[R]eliance on case law can be a risky proposition”). 
 102. Id. (stating that reliance on the MPEP is the “safest bet” for an examiner because it 
provides guidance and instructions about the prosecution of patent applications). 
 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2009) (allowing for documents to be filed as 
declarations in lieu of oaths). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009) (stating applicant’s duty to file an 
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There is also the fact that the majority of Examiners and, increasingly, 
practitioners, are non-attorney scientists.104 These may appear to be 
unessential to the overall issues raised herein, but this is assuredly not so. 
The point is not that Examiners and non-attorney practitioners are incapable 
of conceptualizing patent law, but rather that their analysis is likely based 
upon a hybrid of their training in scientific methodology and legal analysis, 
as opposed to pure legal analysis.105 As noted by the USPTO, “A patent 
examiner must accept a utility asserted by an applicant unless the Office has 
evidence or sound scientific reasoning to rebut the assertion.  The 
Examiner’s decision must be supported by a preponderance of all the 
evidence of record.”106 Thus, a ruling based purely on legal precedents, 
such as that put forth by the Bilski Supreme Court, may likely suffer the fate 
of inconsistent application in the field of patent examination and 
prosecution.107  
The BPAI has been inherently sympathetic to such ordeals, and “[t]he 
USPTO is struggling to identify some way to objectively analyze the 
statutory subject matter issue instead of just saying ‘we know it when we 
see it.’”108 However, the Supreme Court has been a bit short in coming to 
their aid by failing to provide rulings that would effectively alleviate the 
BPAI’s ‘we know it when we see it’ concern.109 No doubt in an effort to 
reduce the soporific effects on Examiners brought on by the reading of the 
 
information disclosure statement in non-provisional applications); 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 & 1.132 
(describing declarations for swearing behind references and declarations for traversing rejections 
or objections, respectively). 
 104. Dennis Crouch, Attorney Versus Agent, PATENTLYO (Aug. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/attorney-versus-agent html. 
 105. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1096 (Jan. 5, 2001) (discussing 
the fact that patent examiners must analyze statutory requirements and scientific reasoning in 
determining a patent grant). 
 106. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). See 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1045 (10th ed. 1998) (defining “scientific 
method” as “principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the 
recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and 
experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses”). 
 107. See Hilberg, supra note 99 (emphasis added).   
 108. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 11 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 109. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010) (U.S. June 28, 2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court in Bilski never provides a satisfying account of what 
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea). 
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Supreme Court Bilski decision, the Patent Office has risen to the occasion 
by issuing several Interim Guides.110  
THE TROUBLE WITH GUIDELINES 
“The state of the law with respect to subject matter eligibility is in 
flux.” 111   
 
The powers and duties of the USPTO are stipulated in the United States 
Code and interpreted by the Code of Federal Regulations.112 It is the duty 
of the USPTO to grant patents commensurate with all relevant laws that are 
placed before it.113  These powers and duties are the penultimate constraints 
in the practice of patent prosecution law.114 As it is so eloquently stated, 
Administrative Law consists of “[t]he procedures created by administrative 
agencies (governmental bodies), including rules, regulations, opinions, and 
orders.  These procedures are often unique to each agency and are 
usually not found in statutes.”115  
 In order to clarify precedents to Examiners, the USPTO has been 
issuing guidelines with rules of examination that attempt to reflect the 
change in the law.116 With Bilski, the USPTO has provided multiple 
guidelines and memorandums.117 However, can these guidelines effectively 
qualify precedents to effectuate consistent examination procedures as are 
their intent?  
The most recent notice published in the Federal Register instructs the 
Examiners with the following:118 
 
 110. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922 (July 27, 2010) (discussing how to utilize the 
machine-or-transformation test in view of the Bilski appellate decision). 
 111.  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions For Evaluating 
Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. §101 (Aug. 24, 2009), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-25_interim_101_instructions.pdf. 
 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). See generally 37 C.F.R. 1 (2009) (defining the powers and 
duties of the Patent and Trademark Office).   
 113. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2009) (defining the nature of an examination). 
 114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 & 1.114 (2009) (setting forth the process for requesting continued 
examination). 
 115. Nolo’s Plain English Law Dictionary, Nolo.com http://www nolo.com/dictionary 
/administrative-law-term html (emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 116. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 117. Id. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922 (July 27, 2010). 
 118. Id. at 43, 922–28. 
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1.  The subject matter eligibility determination should not be 
burdensome to most Examiners as they will not be likely to 
encounter it;  
2. Patent Examiners are asked to state all “non-cumulative 
reasons and bases” for claim rejections in their first Office 
Action;  
3. Examination for an appropriate prima facie case of ineligibility 
must include:  
A. Claim evaluation as a whole;  
B. A weighing of the relevant factors of Bilski and previous 
Supreme Court precedent; and  
C. A determination of whether the claims comply with 
subject matter eligibility of §101;  
4. Consideration of rebuttal arguments and evidence supporting 
subject matter eligibility by the Office; 
5. A reminder that § 101 is not the sole tool for determining 
patentability for claims that recite an abstract idea (§§ 102, 103 
and 112 should also be considered); 
6. Patent Examiners should also avoid focusing on issues of 
patent-eligibility except in “the most extreme cases;” and  
7. The previously used “abstract-idea exception” should be 
utilized in evaluating the claims for patent eligibility over the 
“machine-or-transformation” test.119  
 
The guideline notice goes on to describe myriad factors that may be 
used to evaluate patent-eligibility of method claims, and it is also important 
to note that the present guideline notice is but one of three that is to be 
consulted in making patent-eligibility evaluations.120  
  Although Number 1 above was intended to allay fears, it has the 
makings of a macabre game of musical chairs with the quaking non-
majority Examiner having no choice but to proceed into the murky hell of 
 
 119. Id. at 43, 923–24. 
 120. Id. See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions for 
Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, (Aug. 24, 2009), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-0825_interim_101_instructions.pdf 
(explaining how to utilize the machine-or-transformation test in view of In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943); Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy 
to Patent Examining Corps (June 28, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam 
/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf; 101 Method Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/bilski_qrs.pdf. 
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guideline interpretations.121 Be that as it may, there is little doubt that the 
guidelines fall short in their intended goal and fail to provide clear and 
concise instructions.122  The best exemplification is that the guidelines in 
question spend an inordinate amount of verbiage to build up the “abstract 
idea exception,” but provide no particular test or language to define it.123 
While the list of factors may be helpful in assisting the Examiner in 
ferreting out patent-eligibility, the subjective language does not provide any 
suggestion that the Examiner is, in fact, applying the rule of law 
correctly.124 As the guideline states: 
 
While the Supreme Court in Bilski did not set forth detailed 
guidance, there are many factors to be considered when 
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a 
determination that a method claim is directed to an abstract idea.  
The following factors are intended to be useful examples and are 
not intended to be exclusive or limiting.  It is recognized that new 
factors may be developed, particularly for emerging technologies.  
It is anticipated that the factors will be modified and changed to 
take into account developments in precedential case law and to 
accommodate prosecution issues that may arise in implementing 
this new practice.125 
 
Note that the factors are an amalgam of the machine-or-transformation 
test, as well as the “abstract idea exception,” and, yet, the guideline makes a 
decisive move in favor of the so-called “abstract idea exception.”126 Thus, 
the Examiner is no closer to being able to ascertain what specific factors 
should or are to be utilized.  
The confusion is compounded by an anomaly resulting from Number 5 
above. While the majority of the Bilski Court stipulates that patent 
eligibility under § 101 is part of an overall inquiry of patentability that 
 
 121.  See Paul Devinksy & Eric M. Shelton, Bilski v. Kappos—Back Where We Started?, 
MONDAQ (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?article_id=108146 
(stating that although the USPTO issued guidelines in response to the Supreme Court’s Bilski 
decision, there is still no definitive test for patentable subject matter in terms of process claims). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43, 924–26. 
 124. Id. at 43, 924. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 43,925–26 
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involves §§ 102, 103 and 112,127 the meaning of such is correctly provided 
by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, wherein he states:  
 
Because the only limitation on the plain meaning of ‘process’ that 
the Court acknowledges explicitly is the bar on abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, and the like, it is presumably this limitation that is 
left to stand between all conceivable human activity and patent 
monopolies.  But many processes that would make for absurd 
patents are not abstract ideas.  Nor can the requirements of 
novelty, nonobviousness, and particular description pick up the 
slack. 128  
 
Thus, the guideline’s suggestion that any shortcomings in examining 
claims under §101 can be made up by examination of the claims under §§ 
102, 103, and 112129 is incorrect. Each statute stands alone, and thus 
examination of the claims under each must also stand alone as it has always 
done. To now advocate that the Examiner look to the other statues in 
support of a patent-ineligibility review requires a “combination” 
examination unsupported in patent practice. In all fairness to the USPTO, it 
is most unlikely that this was their intent. However, such is the predictable 
consequence of interpretation in the world devoid of a relevant Rosetta 
Stone.130  
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the problems with guidelines are 
not new.131 The BPAI has provided a concurrent, detailed review of 
interpretations through the years, and much of their opinions remain 
salient.132 For instance, the BPAI stated:  
 
Guidelines are intended to instruct examiners on how to apply the 
law to the facts.  The Board is not bound by such guidelines but 
applies the law directly to the facts.  The Interim Guidelines 
 
 127. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
 128. Id. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 129. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View 
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43, 923–24. 
 130. Angela D. Follett, Note, The Problem with Bilski: Medical Diagnostic Patent Claims 
Reveal Weaknesses in a Narrow Subject Matter Test, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 229, 233 (2009) 
(“Such a change in the status quo of statutory patentability will undoubtedly have unpredictable 
implications on patents issued under the old standard, applications currently pending in the Patent 
and Trademark Office, and on inventions not yet conceived.”). 
 131. See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.  
 132. See, e.g., Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
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state: ‘Rejections will be based upon the substantive law and it is 
these rejections which are appealable.  Consequently, any failure 
by USPTO personnel to follow the Guidelines is neither 
appealable nor petitionable’. . . this exercise underscores, for this 
panel, several problems with the Interim Guidelines that limit 
their usefulness severely.133  
 
As per the USPTO, in its July 27, 2010, Interim Guideline: 
 
This guidance does not constitute substantive rule making and 
hence does not have the force and effect of law.  Rejections will 
continue to be based upon the substantive law, and it is these 
rejections that are appealable. Consequently, any perceived 
failure by Office personnel to follow this guidance is neither  
 appealable nor petitionable.134   
 
What, then, is the relevance of instructions on the administrative 
application of substantive law that cannot be challenged or argued on the 
basis of its interpretation of substantive law? Additionally, what is their 
relevance if the rejections themselves are based upon the Examiner’s 
incorrect reliance on the guidelines?  
To stay one step ahead of the law, commentators have suggested that 
practitioners narrowly draft claims with the “machine-or-transformation” 
test in mind.135 However, such actions may be quixotic in light of the 
amorphous framework proscribed by the USPTO, without any measure of 
recourse, but we must also consider that we are in the twilight of the 
guideline movement. The true measure of their worth shall be the test of 
 
 133. Id. at 35 (citing U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of 
Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, United States Patent and Trademark 
Office at 142 (Nov. 22, 2005),  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/ 
patgupa htm). 
 134. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View 
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,926 (emphasis added). 
 135. See, e.g., USPTO Interim Bilski Guidelines: David Luettgen of Foley & Lardner Weighs 
In, PATENT LAW PRACTICE CENTER (Aug. 6, 2010), http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/08/ 
06/uspto-interim-bilski-guidelines-david-luettgen-of-foley-lardner-weighs-in/ (suggesting that 
“companies should also consider including claims in their patent applications that more clearly 
satisfy the [machine-or-transformation] test”). 
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time. Thus, the answer to our query on the guidelines’ abilities to 
functionalize precedents is the ubiquitous “perhaps.”136  
A TANGEBILITY PRINCIPLE 
“Why should we treat information about tangible things in a manner 
that is categorically different from the manner in which we treat 
information about intangible things?” 137   
 
In the course of its analysis, it was also perhaps the Bilski Court’s intent to 
alert legislators that the reforms placed before it are timely. Justice Stevens 
noted: 
 
[A]bsent a discernible signal from Congress, we proceed 
cautiously when dealing with patents that press on the limits of 
the “‘standard written into the constitution,’” for at the “fringes 
of congressional power,” “more is required of legislatures than a 
vague delegation to be filled in later[.]” We should not casually 
risk exceeding the constitutional limitation on Congress’ 
behalf.138 
 
Given the number of recently remanded cases, it might also be a 
directive to the lower courts that the patent system requires better definitive 
structures for Constitutional interpretation.139 Regardless, the plethora of 
inevitable legal gyrations from Bilski’s systemic review has served to quake 
the terrain of patent examination and prosecution, for there have been 
diminishing returns in the manner by which precedential legal authorities 
 
 136. I have always held a deep respect for the BPAI, but never more so than in the reading of 
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006) at 35 n.8 (“Elizabeth:  You have to take 
me to shore!  According to the Code of the Order of the Brethren.  Barbossa:  First, your return to 
shore was not part of our negotiations nor our agreement, so I ‘must’ do nothin’.  And secondly, 
you must be a pirate for the pirate’s code to apply, and you’re not.  And thirdly, the code is more 
what you call guidelines than actual rules.  Welcome aboard the Black Pearl, Miss Turner.” (citing 
Pirates of the Caribbean (Disney 2003))). 
 137.  Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone Meta, 3 
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/collinsmetabilski.pdf.  Note that Professor 
Collin's paper is a commentary on the Bilski appellate Case.  The quote has been used outside the 
context of his paper. 
 138.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Graham v. Deere, 38 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109, 139–40 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 139. See, e.g., supra note 2. 
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can affect a well established administrative system of review. 140 The 
USPTO has made valiant attempts to weld applicable rulings with 
administrative guidance,141 but its intent is misplaced, for one cannot inject 
subjectivity into a system that presumes validity on its face and only allows 
for two responses: allowance or rejection.142 
  In light of pending legislative changes in patent law and the 
onslaught of judicial precedents, 143 it may be timely to consider tangible 
alternatives that are better able to absorb large and small shifts in the law, 
while concurrently weighing existing and pending examination/prosecution 
policies. These alternatives should be developed in sight of normative as 
well as disjunctive identifiers. One should consider interesting perspectives 
such as the Supreme Court’s use of the Graham v. Deere144 ruling in 
analyzing patent eligibility of method claims under 35 USC §101.145  
The key to such an analysis should begin by recognizing that formal 
review of some statutes under U.S. patent law might be untenable. There 
should also be real recognition that emerging and future technologies are 
unpredictable, and that the present system may be ill-equipped to offer 
traditional patent protection.146  
  Commentators have suggested patent “reforms” in other frameworks 
that warrant consideration in light of the changes to 35 U.S.C. § 101. One 
suggestion is that “information asymmetries between inventors and patent 
officials can be overcome if the government offers a menu of patents of 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. See, e.g., Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims 
in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010). 
 142. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Process for Obtaining a Utility Patent,  
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/index.jsp (last visited January 13, 2011). 
 143. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, to Harry Reid, Majority Leader (Sept. 
15, 2010) available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/111thCongress 
/upload/091510JointLetterToReId.pdf (requesting Majority Leader Reid bring the Managers’ 
Amendment to S.515, the Patent Reform Act, to the Senate floor for consideration, and further 
stating that the Amendment shall (1) speed up the patent application process; (2) allow for 
opposition practice during application; (3) allow for post grant review; (4) enhance international 
harmonization, and (5) allow for greater predictability in patent infringement litigation). 
 144. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 145. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Graham 
v. Deere 38 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 146. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,924 (July 27, 2010) (“It is recognized that new 
factors may be developed, particularly for emerging technologies. It is anticipated that the factors 
will be modified and changed to take into account developments in precedential case law and to 
accommodate prosecution issues that may arise in implementing this new practice.”). 
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different lengths,” thereby leading to a greater ability to invest in research 
and development.147 Thus, it might be prudent to consider alternatives such 
as variability in patent terms based on the longevity of the technology 
and/or the business entity’s ability to provide funding to sustain patent 
protection. Additionally, alternatives such as lower filing costs for 
continuation-type applications (that forego subjective statutory review) with 
limited terms and protective schemes, such as limited protection against 
infringement litigation practices, may also be added to the options available 
for patent protection.148 While the list of suggestions appears to be long, 
there is a great need to holistically explore the mode and manner of patent 
practice and consider suggestions great, small, conservative and radical 
from what has become an extended patent family.149 
As previously mentioned, the goal of this paper has been to promote 
thought and discourse that may lead to alternative standards of examination 
and prosecution for statutory provisions that are prone to subjective 
interpretations. It is imperative that adaptable mechanisms be sought and 
implemented that will continue “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience 
and useful [a]rts” for existing, emerging and future technologies, as has 
been the continuing agenda of our Patent system.150 
.PP4 
 
 147. Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 112, 116 
(2005). 
 148. See id. at 116–17. 
 149. This "family" should include practitioners, litigators, examiners, agency and private 
policy makers, academics, judges, specialty bar organizations and the oft-silent patent searcher.   
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
